Theories Of Learning: Behaviourism And Multiple Intelligences
Originally written in 2011, with minor changes for the web
Introduction
Theories of learning should underpin teachers' classroom practice.
There is much in teaching that is learnt "on the job", but without the rigour of academic discipline in forming, testing and critiquing hypotheses, teachers may be led astray.
Teachers are bombarded with advice on how to teach and contradictory theories of how the learning mind operates, so it is essential to take a critical view of learning theories before applying them in the classroom.
It makes little sense to decide how to teach before one has spent some time studying how people learnSotto, 2007, p33
We will critically examine two of the most prominent learning theories influencing classroom teaching today, Behaviourism and MI Theory. We will outline the basics of each theory, explore the challenges to each and finally analyse their implications for classroom teachers.
Behaviourism
The Theory
The basics
History
Scientific experimental research on humans started in the nineteenth century when Wundt set up a psychological laboratory in Germany in 1879 (Child, 2010). At the turn of the century, Pavlov, Watson and Thorndike started studying how animals and humans behaved in controlled circumstances (Child, 2010).
Watson was the first to conclude that the temporal proximity of successful stimulus-response (S-R) connections was proportionate to their likelihood of reoccurring (Child, 2010). If a person (or animal) attempts to solve a problem, the next time they face a similar problem, they are likely to repeat their prior actions that came shortly before successfully solving it. The strongest S-R bonds are formed when stimulus and response occur simultaneously.
While accepting Watson's theory, Thorndike thought that rewarding responses were more important than their timing, and S-R bonds are generated when an action is reinforced by a satisfying result (Child, 2010). Therefore, while showing a child a picture of an apple whenever they say the word may help them make the association, giving a child an apple whenever they say the word would be more effective.
Pavlov also thought of behaviour as responses caused by stimuli but limited his research to reflex actions - famously the salivation reflex in dogs (Child, 2010).
Many early behaviourists thought S-R bonds were formed only with elicited responses and not emitted responses (classical conditioning). However, Skinner concentrated on creating S-R bonds by rewarding or punishing emitted responses (operant conditioning) (Child, 2010).
Because Skinner is the best-known behaviourist of our time, and his theories are the most influential in classrooms today, we will focus hereafter on his specific theory of Behaviourism.
Rationale
Skinner's theory started with the question, "How can we anticipate and affect people's actions?" He viewed the chain of S-R as:
External stimulus ➡ Internal feelings ➡ External response
Therefore, if we want to anticipate or affect a person's actions, we must either appropriately stimulate them or observe their internal feelings.
Mentalists attributed what a person does to internal feelings. However, Skinner baulked at this idea
The practice of looking inside the organism for an explanation of behaviour has tended to obscure the variables which are immediately available for scientific analysis. These variables lie outside the organism, in its immediate environment and in its environmental historyin Sotto, 2007, pp37-38
So Skinner changed his S-R chain to:
External stimulus ➡ External response
By this, he was not denying the existence of internal feelings but viewed them as a black box that could be ignored for functional analysis. Psychologists could then study behaviour scientifically with controllable inputs and measurable outputs.
To summarise Skinner's way of thinking, If we know that a child has not eaten for a long time, and if we know that he therefore feels hungry and that because he feels hungry he then eats, then we know that if he has not eaten for a long time, he will eat
(Skinner, 1974, p13).
Method
As mentioned above, Skinner favoured the approach of Operant Conditioning over Classical Conditioning. Classical Conditioning dealt with creating S-R bonds with elicited responses (making a dog salivate by presenting it with food). However, Skinner moved beyond reflex actions to S-R bonds with emitted responses (a bird happens to walk in a circle and learns this results in a reward). This is why Skinner's conditioning is called Operant Conditioning, as the subject (the operant) has some degree of freedom in their responses.
He then used positive and negative reinforcers to produce S-R bonds - a particular action would lead to a reward or the cessation of a negative stimulus such as captivity, leading the subject to repeat that action in future.
A Black Box
In the novel "Matter", when the Regent asks his Field Marshal if he trusts the Oct (an alien race), he replies,
Trust? Trust seems irrelevant. They will do certain things or not, and those things will match with what they have said they will do, or not. Whatever guides their actions is hidden behind so many layers of untranslatable thought it might as well be based on pure chance. Their alien nature precludes human attributes like trustBanks, 2008, pp189-190
Much of Skinner's thinking relies on viewing all internal thoughts as "alien". Either someone will react in a certain way to a stimulus, or they will not, and to speculate as to what internal processes guide their actions is a fool's errand. This thinking all hinges on our internal thoughts being a black box, as if they are known, then surely mentalism provides better answers.
In interviews with tennis players, they do very poorly at describing how they successfully hit a ball. Slow-motion footage reveals physical movements the players are not consciously aware of (Gladwell, 2006). It would seem our internal thoughts are sometimes a black box, even to ourselves.
Nevertheless, whether these internal thoughts are known or not, it would appear they are still relevant and can not be simply stepped over as Skinner suggests. Pritchard notes that:
…alongside this growing interest in behaviour… came the growing realisation that the unseen mental processes involved in learning… had an important bearing on the understanding of how we learnPritchard, 2005, p4
Thus, it appears Skinner's theory may have more usefulness in the study of reflexes than in application in the classroom setting.
Speculative and Circular
Skinner often makes statements about internal feelings without argument or evidence. For example, he claims without evidence that feelings are the result of only genetic and environmental histories; feelings are not what cause reinforcement but merely accompany it; and that feelings do not cause behaviour but have a common cause (Skinner, 1974). This makes his theory appear speculative and circular.
Skinner admitted himself that Much of the argument goes beyond the established facts
(1974, p19), and Sotto points to the circularity that a reinforcer is defined as that which causes a behaviour to be repeated
(2007, p38).
Skinner defends himself by saying that if speculation is precluded from science, then much of astronomy and atomic physics would be cast out.
What Skinner seems to have failed to recognise is that while speculation may be used in hypotheses, theories should be founded on experimental evidence and sound reasoning.
Materialistic
Skinner saw feelings as the result of genetic and environmental histories (1974). He seems to share common ground with the techno-prophet Ray Kurzweil, who said:
The intelligence of machines will exceed human intelligence early in this century… By intelligence, I include all of the diverse and subtle ways in which humans are intelligentKurzweil in Strobel, 2004, p245
These lines of thinking have their roots in materialism. If nothing exists except the material things controlled by the rigid laws of physics, humans and machines are comparable, and feelings can be calculated from genetic and environmental histories.
John Searle, a professor of mind at the University of California at Berkeley, thinks otherwise.
You can expand the power all you want, hooking up as many computers as you think you need, and they still won't be conscious, because all they'll ever do is shuffle symbolsSearle in Strobel, 2004, p248
While Skinner may think shuffling symbols is all humans do, the existence of something more, consciousness, has been known for centuries:
Cogito ergo sumDescartes in Strobel, 2004, p245
[I think; therefore I am]
Even if Skinner's materialistic position is to be accepted, we are then faced with the logical conclusion that we cannot know if Skinner's theory is correct. The evolutionist Haldane put it very well;
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of the atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true… and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atomsHaldane in Strobel, 2004, p266
Humans and Animals
Aside from applying conclusions from experiments with animals to humans, Skinner also ascribed very animalistic intelligence to us. For example, he said:
We learn to look for an object when we acquire behavior which commonly has the consequence of discovering it. Thus, to look for a match is to look in a manner previously reinforced by finding matchesSkinner, 1974, p57
It is easy to think of circumstances where the manner of looking for a match has not been previously reinforced. For example, when you open a matchbox and find it empty, you do not close the matchbox and then open it again in an attempt to find a match inside. Humans use a depth of reasoning not explained by conditioning.
Thorndike, the father of Skinner's theory, said that he began his work "to give the coup de grace to the despised theory that animals reason"
(in Hilgard & Bower, 1975); he did not think his experimental results applied to humans.
The incongruence of the observed behaviour of animals and humans should be well understood in any application of Skinner's theory.
Free-Will
Skinner's theory seems to discount the concept of free will. He states unequivocally that "if he has not eaten for a long time, he will eat"
(1974, p13), leaving no room for choice. But what if the individual chooses not to eat? What of those around the world on hunger strikes?
There is a much simpler explanation for Skinner's experimental observations - subjects do not respond because of their S-R bonds acquired through conditioning, but instead, they respond because they remember the previous positive and negative re-enforcements. When you go to the cupboard to find food, it is not because you were conditioned to but because you remember where you put the food, and you remember that eating food removes your hunger. This remembering leads to your choice to respond - or your choice to starve yourself.
An experiment in verbal positive reinforcement showed that those with conscious knowledge of the desired behaviour performed vastly better than those who were not conscious of the goal (Hilgard & Bower, 1975). This indicates that the subjects chose to respond in the way they did.
However, another experiment which rewarded minute muscle responses showed a positive correlation (Hilgard & Bower, 1975). This indicates the possibility that unconscious physical actions may be conditioned (though see the discussion on Thin-Slicing later).
If proof were needed of the possibility to override severe conditioning with free will, look towards the Vietnam war:
I heard a former advisor to the president say that B.F. Skinner's behaviourism influenced the Pentagon's strategy… So in Vietnam, we bombed, we came back, we bombed, we came back, we bombed, and so forth… Eventually they had to give in… It didn't work… Because there was more to the Vietnamese than their physical brains responding to stimuli. They have souls, desires, feelings, and beliefs, and they could make free choices to suffer and to stand firm for their convictions despite our attempt to condition them by our bombingMoreland in Strobel, 2004, p256
Modelling and Thin-Slicing
As we have already seen, Skinner viewed behaviour as:
External stimulus ➡ Internal feelings ➡ External response
before simplifying this to:
External stimulus ➡ External response
This simplification only works with the assumption that you can never have behaviour created by spontaneous internal feelings.
Modelling
One human experience which seems to work against Skinner's assumption is the internal modelling we do which often changes behaviour.
For example, a person scared of spiders may visit a therapist who gets them to imagine (to model) safe, even pleasurable, experiences with spiders. Their behaviour of acting fearfully can thus be modified without external stimulus (though behaviourists may simply move the goalposts and claim the therapist was the external stimulus). Or perhaps a person is at a train station saying farewell to a loved one - they cry not because the person has already left but because they model in their heads what it will be like after they have left.
Experiments using subconscious suggestion have shown that simply thinking about words we associate with being old makes people walk more slowly, without conditioning. The same is true of "aggressive", "polite", "clever" and "stupid" word associations and their behavioural outcomes (Gladwell, 2006). This points towards internal, subconscious modelling of reality affecting human behaviour. The S-R approach would only expect these results with prior conditioning and re-enforcing behavioural outcomes - both of which were not present. To remove the argument that the stimulus is external, not internal - simply choosing to think clever thoughts before an exam can improve your results without exposure to the words (Gladwell, 2006).
People's different internal models go some way to explain the behaviour of psychiatric patients - something that Behaviourism fails to explain adequately.
Thin-Slicing
A related human experience to modelling is Thin Slicing - "the ability of our unconscious to find patterns in situations and behaviour based on very narrow slices of experience" (Gladwell, 2006, p23). This theory does not refute Skinner's view of conditioning but provides an alternative that incorporates the phenomenon of modelling.
A simple game was played in an experiment at the University of Iowa. Players were presented with four face-down decks of cards - two blue and two red. Each card the player turns over either loses or gains them money. What players did not know is that blue cards were better on average than red cards (Gladwell, 2006).
After fifty cards, players had a 'hunch' that blue cards were better than red, and after eighty cards, they could articulate why blue cards were better than red cards. However, after only ten cards, players started to have a sweat response to the red cards and unconsciously started turning over more blue cards.
These findings can be explained through Behaviourism. However, the alternative view of Thin Slicing - that players subconsciously modelled the situation and internally changed their behaviour - can equally explain the findings and why phobias can be "thought away" and people can miss their lovers while they are still there.
Higher Order Skills
When behaviourists talk about learning, they usually mean the ability to do something that one could not previously do. It follows that 'learning' results in 'a change'
(Sotto, 2007, p34). So when a behaviourist wants to measure learning, they are looking to measure a changed behaviour that leads to success.
We learn to look for an object when we acquire behavior which commonly has the consequence of discovering itSkinner, 1974, p57
Contrary to this viewpoint is Lashley's findings (in Sotto, 2007), who trained a rat to obtain food by performing specific movements. He then removed parts of the rat's brain, preventing it from carrying out those movements, after which the rat obtained food by carrying out different movements. Thus, the rat had not learned a set of behaviours that commonly had the consequence of food but rather had learned the model of how to obtain food and invented behaviour that fitted the model.
An experiment by Tolman (in Sotto, 2007) similarly showed that rats in a maze do not learn the behaviour of how to escape, but they learn to model the maze and then invent behaviour to reach the exit.
This is why Programmed Manuals/Teaching Machines were a failure: …except where routine skills are to be learnt, they have now all been discarded
(Sotto, 2007, pp35-36). Behaviouristic teaching does not lead to real learning — it leads to repetition. "Do the right thing for a reward and keep repeating the same action". The higher-order skills of application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation are beyond the scope of behaviourism.
Behaviourism cannot cater for all kinds of learning since it disregards mental activitiesNagowah & Nagowah, 2009, p281
Classroom Implications
While somewhat outdated now, [Behaviourism] still has a strong influence on educational practice, if not theoryMuijs, 2007, p45
Despite the criticisms above, Behaviourism has seemed to be applicable in classrooms over the decades. We will now attempt to find useful applications with the proviso that it is limited to simple behavioural modification and not deep learnings.
Types of Learning
Since Behaviourism can not teach higher-order skills, it should be used in conjunction with other learning theories.
…whereas a behaviouristic teacher desires to change the observable behaviours of students in a significant way, a cognitive-interactionist teacher aspires to help students develop their understandings of significant problems and situationsBigge & Shermis, 2004, p11
A teacher's job is not only to teach understanding but to teach behaviour. If they are to change the observable behaviour of a pupil who shouts out or refuses to work, then Behaviourism is a valuable tool. However, if they are to develop a pupil's understanding, Behaviourism would be the wrong tool.
Reward vs Punishment
Before comparing rewards and punishments, we must first clarify the difference between punishment and negative reinforcement. Whereas punishment is designed to remove existing behaviour, negative reinforcement is designed to elicit behaviour - such as one that can be caused through pain or "the punishment for not behaving" in the desired way (Skinner, 1974, p62).
Punishment, though designed to remove behaviour, is not the reverse of conditioning (be the conditioning negative or positive) as its effects also create new avoidance behaviours. Instead of the subject ceasing the behaviour, they simply try to continue with the behaviour while avoiding the punishment (Skinner, 1974). Punishing a cat for jumping on the kitchen work surface teaches them only to do it when their owner is out of the house.
Even early behaviourists such as Thorndike realised that the positive effects of rewards were much stronger than the negative effects of punishment.
The results of all comparisons by all methods tell the same story. Rewarding a connection always strengthened it substantially; punishing it weakened it little or not at allThorndike in Hilgard & Bower, 1975, p39
Knowing this, teachers should always look for ways to positively reinforce pupil behaviour rather than concentrating on punishment - something that has seen a swing in schools from the cane to house points systems. Sadly most school discipline policies are still much longer than school reward policies.
One objection to using rewards over punishment in operant conditioning is that the subject must first be active in a way that produces a reward, but …in a conventional classroom, the learners will probably be sitting on their backsides and listening… there would be very little in their behaviour that could be reinforced
(Sotto, 2007, p35). This is often the desired behaviour though, and thus should be reinforced. But what if the desired behaviour is not present?
This is why Skinner concluded that each step of learning should be short and follow from prior learning, and others conclude rewards may be used to reinforce approximate behaviour at first before only rewarding the specifically desired behaviour later (Child, 2010).
MI Theory
The Theory
The basics
An Idea, Not a Theory
From the outset, it must be highlighted that the theory of Multiple Intelligences ( Theory) is more of an idea than a fully developed theory, despite its age. The current leading proponent of the theory, Gardner, openly says, …I want to underscore that the notion of multiple intelligences is hardly a proven scientific fact
(1993, pp10-11).
History
MI Theory has its roots in Intelligence Quotient (IQ) Theory. We will not say much on this but to state its roots in the concept that everyone has a General Intelligence that can be measured and used to score individuals against each other.
MI Theory looks to solve a practical problem with IQ Theory:
…the score on an intelligence test does predict one's ability to handle school subjects, though it foretells little of success in later life… [therefore]… There must be more to intelligence than short answers to short questionsGardner, 1993, p3
Gardner set about defining what intelligence might be beyond general intelligence.
Rationale
It has long been noted that in IQ tests, Scores on the subtests tend to cluster together in groups, which seem to be tapping recognizable abilities or, 'factors'
(Fox, 2005, p186). Even outside the field of psychology, it is innately apparent to some that intelligence should include all of the diverse and subtle ways in which humans are intelligent - including musical and artistic aptitude, creativity, physically moving, and … responding to emotion
(Kurzweil in Strobel, 2004, p245).
Gardner finds the middle ground by suggesting that we do not possess a single General Intelligence but Multiple Intelligences (MIs) and that In ordinary life…these intelligences typically work in harmony, and so their autonomy may be invisible
(1993, p9). Therefore, to measure an individual's intelligence is to discover their profile of intelligences - some of which may be significantly higher or lower than others.
Method
In order to catalogue these intelligences, Gardner produced a set of criteria to bring some scientific rigour to an otherwise speculative process. He defined intelligences as:
Child, 2010, pp287-288…Activities which
- (a) were affected by brain damage in different locations of the brain
- (b) were represented by exceptional people
- (c) had unique core skills
- (d) had distinct developmental histories
- (e) were plausible on historical and evolutionary grounds
- (f) had support from psychological research
These criteria initially led Gardner to seven MIs, and more have been added. At one point, Gardner's list looked like this:
Jarvis, 2005, p52
- Linguistic/Verbal
- The ability to use language in written and oral forms
- Logical/mathematical
- The ability to reason logically and manipulate numbers
- Visual/spatial
- The ability to recognise and produce visual images
- Kinaesthetic
- The ability to coordinate the body and use it to express and achieve goals
- Musical
- The ability to recognise and produce music
- Naturalist
- The ability to recognise and interact with the natural world
- Interpersonal
- The ability to understand the motives, emotional states and intentions of others
- Intrapersonal
- The ability to understand one's own motives, characteristics, strengths and weaknesses
An Undercooked Theory
A recurring feeling when reading about MI Theory is that it is distinctly unfinished. Unlike more mathematical theories that require a sea-change in thinking to modify, MI Theory seems to change with the tides.
For starters, there was a "constant" modification of Gardner's criteria for what constitutes an intelligence (Gardner, 2003, p4).
This, and the ambiguity of some criteria, has led to many revisions of the number and type of intelligences. Some argued, If a talent at music is to be included, then why not include a talent at sculpture, or photography, or drama
(Fox, 2005, p187)? Thus, after starting with seven intelligences in 1983 (Jarvis, 2005), Gardner's list was reduced to six in 1993 (Child, 2010). The list then grew slowly to ten in 1999 (Child, 2010) and then fell to eight-and-a-half in 2003 (Gardner, 2003) [quite how you can have half an intelligence is not expanded upon in that publication].
This is not to say that theories should not be corrected when new knowledge comes to light. However, the shear fluidity expressed in only twenty years indicates an immaturity in the theory. Perhaps this is why:
…it was educators, rather than psychologists, who found the theory of most interestGardner, 2003, p4
It would seem that the theory's application in education is ahead of its acceptance by its peers.
Cause or Effect?
One of the difficulties experienced when trying to apply MI Theory is the question, "Are intelligences what we use to learn, or are intelligences what we have learnt?"
Snyder found a positive correlation between grade average and visual intelligence…suggesting that a visual learning style advantages students on conventional educational settings
(in Jarvis, 2005, p56), but was this alternatively suggesting that those with a high grade average had learnt visual intelligence?
This question of cause or effect rather hamstrings MI Theory when it comes to application. Should you play to pupils' existing intelligences or teach them the ones they are lacking?
Some would say this is a false dichotomy and that intelligences are learned and used to learn.
Achievement is talent plus preparation. The problem with this view is that the closer psychologists look at the career of the gifted, the smaller the role innate talent seems to play and the bigger the role preparation seems to playGladwell, 2008, p38
[Although this could be a snowballing effect with the intelligence used to learn and the intelligence learnt becoming one]
Gladwell gives several examples of individuals who excel in a single intelligence [although he does not refer to them in this way], highlighting that the intelligence in each case was learnt, and their success was not due to having a certain MI initially.
One example given is The Beatles, who were reportedly bad musicians before circumstances forced them to play eight-hour gigs for 270 nights in Hamburg. They were no good onstage when they went there and they were very good when they came back
(Norman in Gladwell, 2008, p50).
A more scientific example given is the study of violinists showing that the number of hours spent practising the violin is the defining factor of success, regardless of starting ability or background (Gladwell, 2008).
These examples and others have led neurologist Daniel Levitin to conclude that:
ten thousand hours of practice is required to achieve the level of mastery associated with being a world-class expert - in anythingLevitin in Gladwell, 2008, p40
Thus, it would seem that any role existing MIs have in learning, the effects of increasing an MI through practice are more important.
Must Everyone Be Intelligent?
We often hear in the news of the spectre of "political correctness gone mad". One recurring example is the practice of giving medals to all participants on school sports days; because "everyone's a winner". It can not be helped but to see some of this thinking in MI theory - "Don't worry if you're not good at logical intelligence, you're just visually intelligent instead."
This makes MI theory quite appealing to our times and sensibilities. Levi aptly wrote:
…when it comes to the quality of our brain we are all very touchy… To be considered stupid and to be told so is more painful than being called gluttonous, mendacious, violent, lascivious, lazy, cowardly: every weakness, every vice, has found its defenders, its rhetoric, its ennoblement and exaltation, but stupidity hasn'tLevi in Fox, 2005, p184
This should make us very weary of our motives in accepting MI theory, and we must be sure to test it by its merits and not by its alternatives. If MI theory has a firm scientific basis, then let it be; but if the entire concept and justification are rooted in staunch equity, then we must admit that not all are equal in intelligence. This is not to say that intellectual imbalance may not be modified with teaching, but to describe learners as we find them with their varying general intelligence.
Common Misconceptions
An examination of MI theory would not be complete without addressing some common misconceptions, as there are many. In an expression of longing for the equity MI theory brings, many educationalists rushed into applying Gardner's theory without examination or transposition to the realm of teaching.
I always maintained that I was a psychologist and not an educator, and did not presume to know how best to teach a class of young persons or run an elementary or secondary school.Gardner, 2003, p6
One such misconception that Gardner has witnessed is the confusion of intelligences with learning styles
(2003, p8). This is an understandable confusion given the similarity between visual learners and visual intelligence. The former is the ability to learn more easily through the visual medium, while the latter is The ability to recognise and produce visual images
(Jarvis, 2005, p52). While these are linked, it does not follow that a pupil with high visual intelligence is necessarily also a visual learner. This misunderstanding has also led to many teachers trying to teach using distinct intelligences - for example, trying to fit them all into every lesson - something Gardner sees as a misunderstanding of his theory.
A second common misconception Gardner identifies is the confounding of a human intelligence with a societal domain (e.g. musical intelligence being equated with mastery of a certain musical genre or role)
(2003, p8). Musical intelligence is more than the act of creating music in the same way that General Intelligence is more than the ability to answer IQ test questions. The intelligences are not skills but competencies.
Classroom Implications
Don't Jump on the Bandwagon
MI theory has rapidly become popular in some schools, but caution should be taken not to go beyond the established facts. As we have seen before, Gardner said:
I want to underscore that the notion of multiple intelligences is hardly a proven scientific fact.Gardner, 1993, pp10-11
One way in which schools have run ahead of the theory is in testing and profiling their pupils. However, the tests to date seem to measure pupils' preferences rather than their intelligences - confusing the intelligences for learning styles.
Specialists or Well-Rounded Individuals?
As educators, we must decide if we wish to educate intelligence specialists or well-rounded individuals. Gardner takes a middle-line on this:
One could channel individuals with unusual talents into special programs, even as one could devise prosthetics and special enrichment programs for individuals presenting an atypical or a dysfunctional profile of intellectual competences.Gardner, 1993, p9
If we wish to create specialists, we should concentrate on giving pupils their ten-thousand hours of practice in areas of a particular intelligence. However, to create rounded individuals, we must discover the weakened intelligences and build them up.
Depth not Breadth
Gardner's theory seems to favour depth over breadth in a curriculum, with each topic being made available to each intelligence. Many commentators have noted that currently, in the UK, we are slanted very heavily towards audio/visual learners and their associated intelligences. It would seem that, whether MI Theory is right or wrong, teachers would be wise to make their lessons less didactic or at least less audible.
Teach Harmoniously
Gardner started with the rationale that In ordinary life…intelligences typically work in harmony, and so their autonomy may be invisible
(1993, p9). If this is the case in ordinary life, then we should not artificially separate the intelligences in the classroom. Our teaching should be as multi-disciplinary as the real world or risk alienating the two.
Understand Your Pupils
Where MI theory may come into its own is as a tool for helping us understand our pupils. "…if individuals differ in their intellectual profiles, it makes sense to take this fact into account in devising an educational system" (Gardner, 2003, p5). Thus, in the same way teachers currently use working levels, learning styles and formative feedback in their planning, MI theory may be a useful tool for differentiation.
As well as helping the teacher, knowledge of their MI profile may also help learners to guide their own learning.
Teaching Concepts
In the same way that Behaviourism has areas of usefulness in teaching, MI theory has its own. Gardner suggests it is:
…particularly useful when a student is trying to master a challenging new concept - say, gravity in physics, or the Zeitgeist in history. I am less persuaded that it can be useful in mastering a foreign language - though I admire those teachers of foreign languages who claim success using MI approaches.Gardner, 2003, p11
Conclusion
Theories of learning should underpin teachers' classroom practice. To do this, a teacher must understand the constraints of these theories and their legitimacy. A teacher should not always teach using the theory of Behaviourism — but it can be useful for teaching behaviour. A teacher should not always teach using MI theory — but it can be useful for differentiation. To master the art of pedagogy, a teacher must first understand the assumptions of a theory, then understand the methodology, and only then use this knowledge to intelligently apply the theory where it can promote learning.